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ABSTRACT 
 
Over recent decades co-management has become an increasingly popular 
form of governance reform in many developing countries. Viewed as a means 
of promoting sustainable and equitable management of natural resources, it 
has seen wide application in small-scale inland fisheries. However, perhaps 
because of its worthy credentials, there has been insufficient critical 
assessment of the results. This paper commences with a review of underlying 
theory which is then used to explore the reasons for failure of a co-
management initiative in Sri Lankan reservoir fisheries between 2001 and 
2002. 
 
Co-management thinking arose from an earlier body of common property 
theory (CPT) which posited private or public ownership of the commons as 
the only rational response to increasing resource pressure. By contrast the 
co-management view states that under certain conditions, management is 
best left to local users, with support from the state, civil society or market 
sector where necessary. In turn, critics of co-management’s rationalistic 
underpinnings point to a lack of cultural or political embeddedness which 
limits understanding of how power and accountability is distributed and 
shapes collective behaviour. Others suggest that the contentiousness of the 
CPT / co-management debate has resulted in neglect of key empirical 
features of fisheries commons – most critically the complex causes and 
consequences of change in fishing effort. 
 
In the Sri Lankan case-study, emphasis is on understanding the 
environmental, technical and socio-economic drivers of effort change. The co-
management initiatives took place in two small-medium size reservoirs (788ha 
and 1546ha) in Northwest province. These support artisanal gill-net fisheries, 
predominantly for exotic tilapias marketed on a highly local basis. The co-
management strategy which involved local fisheries officers and fishing co-
operatives, centred on fishing restrictions designed to sustain yields and 
increase mean catch size. Despite initial enthusiasm, the restrictions 
collapsed after 4-5 months with the onset of opportunistic free-riding. This was 
due to; lack of enforcement capacity, disproportionate hardship faced by the 
least economically mobile fisher groups and political patronage relations. 
Also, as compliant partners, the co-operatives had weak leverage in the 
decision making process. 
 
Despite the short duration of effective restrictions, simultaneous analysis of 
local market trends demonstrated a remarkable rebound in yields pointing to 
the resilient regenerative capacity of the tilapia fishery. Furthermore historic 
commodity price data reveal long-term tilapia price stability and a close match 
between demand and supply even as fishing pressure has increased. Despite 
negative impacts on indigenous biodiversity, these features suggest fears of 
over-exploitation are unfounded and question the underlying premise for the 
co-management interventions. 
 
Finally, results are used to highlight contextual differences with floodplain 
fisheries in Bangladesh, where declining wild harvests and the emergence of 
a vibrant aquaculture industry present very different challenges. Results 
caution against over-reliance on co-management as a blue print approach. 
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There is instead a need for detailed contextual analyses which move beyond 
a view of fisheries as closed-systems to incorporate broader livelihood based 
perspectives. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Common property resources such as fisheries, forests, rangelands, ground 
water resources and wildlife present formidable challenges to resource 
managers. Yet inland fisheries, the focus of this paper, are of disproportionate 
importance to the poor, relative to their volume and extent. Most are small-
scale with over 90% of recorded inland fisheries catch; 8.2 million tonnes in 
1998 (FAO 1999) coming from developing countries. Actual production is 
likely to be much higher due to uncertainty associated with micro-dispersed 
landings and high levels of localised subsistence consumption. Consequently 
inland fisheries have often been under-valued by policy makers. 
 
Co-management can be defined as a partnership between the community of 
local resources users, other primary stakeholders (e.g. fish traders, service 
providers etc.), government and NGO’s who together share responsibility and 
authority for resource management (Macfadyen et al 2005). The co-
management approach also serves to shift emphasis from a fish-production to 
a people centric focus within the more holistic context of rural communities 
(ODI 2002). Its popularity amongst policy makers has been driven by 
recognition of a need to formalise existing community management practices 
within the wider legalistic and governance frameworks as a response to 
resource depletion and conflicts associated with rising fishing pressure. 
Decentralisation policies being pursued in many developing countries have 
also contributed to an enabling policy environment (Macfadyen et al ibid). 
 
These factors, perhaps together with the ‘participatory’ merit implicit in the 
notion of co-management have resulted in widespread donor support for pilot 
programmes. However, there has been little rigorous evaluation of the 
anticipated impacts on target beneficiaries or with regard to the likely 
sustainability of these institutional forms.  
Such assessments are essential if co-management is to be validated against 
alternative modes of governance reform. This paper is concerned with 
evaluating the potential of co-management strategies in small-scale inland 
fisheries as a means of empowering the poorest groups dependent on these 
resources to benefit from, and manage them sustainably.  
 
The paper commences with a brief chronological review of theory relating to 
the management of the commons highlighting major policy impacts over 
recent decades. This is followed by a case study of co-management in two 
artisanal reservoir fisheries of the lowland Dry-Zone, Sri Lanka. The failure of 
these interventions is assessed in the context of the preceding theory. Finally, 
the relevance of the findings is used to highlight the comparative advantages 
of different co-management options in the context of Bangladesh floodplain 
fisheries. 
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CHALLENGING THE CONSENSUS – A REVIEW OF COLLECTIVE 
MANAGEMENT THEORY 
 
Over recent years the debate over how to best manage natural resources 
traditionally used by many individuals under shared access arrangements has 
revolved around two broad notions of (1) top-down management and (2) 
community or co-management (Fig. 1). The fisheries NR sector has been 
particularly instrumental in the development of both schools of thought. 
 
The top-down management approach is associated with common property 
theory (CPT) which arose from a body of quantitative equilibrium models 
propounded by economists and natural scientists from the 1940’s onwards 
(e.g. Von Neumann and Morgenstern, Schaefer 1954, Gordon 1954 and 
1944, Hardin 1968). Ecological and economic concepts such as maximum 
sustainable yield, carrying capacity, resource rent etc. were incorporated in 
strategic game play models which assumed rational self-interest as the basis 
of decision making behaviour. The now familiar end point of Hardin’s game 
play in his seminal Tragedy of the Commons (1968) was that due to 
opportunistic ‘free-riding’ behaviour, common property resources will 
ultimately be over-exploited and depleted without some degree of private 
enclosure or government access regulation. 
 
This view has since been challenged by the community/ co-management 
proponents advocating decentralisation and local level management reforms 
for much of the commons. Rather than being a discrete theory, this view 
arose from a ‘reactionary’ body of inter-disciplinary research initiated by 
human ecologists and anthropologists in the 1970’s (e.g. Acheson 1981, 
Berkes, 1977). These researchers used empirical case studies from natural 
resource settings around the world to challenge some of the basic 
assumptions underlying CPT.  
 
A key premise of the ‘top-down’ management view is that resource users are 
unable to self-regulate due to the open access nature of the resource. 
Community management protagonists responded to the reductionism of this 
view by differentiating between two key features of shared resources; 
subtractibility - the degree to which one person's use will subtract from 
another and excludability the ability to control the number of resource users in 
the production system (Ostrom et al 1999, Berkes 2006). They went on to 
show under certain ecological and institutional forms, these features were 
sufficiently low/ high respectively to predispose local level NR management as 
the most sustainable and cost effective management forms. Communities, 
they observed, do in fact frequently develop sensible precautions against 
resource depletion based on a range of legally pluralistic social institutions 
including unwritten or customary local laws. Their conclusion is that ‘open 
access’ and ‘common property resources (CPR)’ are in fact two sub-sets of a 
wider ‘common pool resource’ where locally managed CPR could be 
considered as a viable fourth property estate (i.e. together with private, public 
and open access regimes). 
 
In the 1980’s the earlier critique of CPT was extended by political scientists 
influenced by the ‘new institutional economics’ (Ostrom 1990, Platteau 1989, 
Pinkerton 1989, Jentoft 1989). The ‘neo-institutionalists’ argued that economic 
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outcomes in the commons could be closely correlated with institutional 
arrangements and their associated transaction costs (literally the costs of co-
operation). Here, institutions are narrowly viewed as ‘systems of rights and 
rules providing incentives and disincentives for individuals to minimise 
transaction costs’ (Ostrom 1990), emphasising the distinction between local/ 
customary and external / modern institutions. This resulted in the earlier 
anthropological emphasis on local community involvement in management 
progressively giving ground to a broader ‘co-management’ view operating in 
the ‘interface between the state, civil society and the market’ (Ostrom ibid). 
Ostrom’s approach to the problem of the commons involved the design of 
durable cooperative institutions organized and governed by the resource 
users themselves (i.e. rather than public or private control). Her eight ‘design 
principles for durable common property resource institutions’ expounded in 
her landmark work ‘Governing the Commons’ (ibid) was to have a major 
influence on other researchers, policy makers and NR managers. The 
principles include clearly defined resource boundaries, user dominated 
mechanisms to resolve conflicts and alter rules, monitors who are resource 
users or accountable to them, graduated sanctions and support / recognition 
of self-organisation rights by external authorities. 
The emergence of the co-management view coincided with the liberalisation 
of centrally planned economies in many developing countries. It was 
consistent with over-lapping policy goals of governmental and non-
governmental sectors by fulfilling a need for fiscal prudence by states coming 
to realise that abundant micro-dispersed natural resources traditionally under 
common ownership were frequently beyond their ability to manage and 
coincided with the emergence of the participatory development paradigm in 
the NGO sector.  
 
McCay and Berkes (1994) framed this co-management position within the 
wider management context (Fig 1) proposing a continuum of seven co-
management ‘partnership arrangements’, distinguished by degrees of power 
sharing and integration of local and centralised management systems. This 
framework will be returned to below within the context of a more recent 
divergence in the ‘management debate’. 
 
 
 
Government Centralised 
Management 
Community-Based 
Self-Governance/ 
Management 
Informing 
   Consultation 
        Cooperation 
  Communication 
        Information Exchange 
  Advisory Role 
        Joint Action 
 Partnership
Co-Management 
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Fig 1. Biopolar co-management framework proposed by McCay and Berkes 
1994 (modified from Bene and Neiland 2006) 
 
More recently Jul-Larsen et al (2003) critique both sides of the management 
debate i.e. the model-based management and neo-institutionalist co-
management schools. They propose a possible third ‘no-management’ option 
as an alternative to classical management theory’s emphasis on limiting 
numbers of fishermen and co-management strategies. Their research 
focussed on biological, institutional and economic characteristics of small and 
medium sized lake fisheries of the South Africa Development Community 
(SADC) region (Democratic Republic of Congo, Malawi, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe). They illustrate their contention by pointing to the fact that static or 
slow change in fishing effort in some of the African lakes they studied does 
not correspond with any effective form of management, either at the state or 
local level. 
 
The point of departure for their critique is the lack of socio-cultural or political 
embeddedness in CPT. Such context is critical to understanding how power 
and responsibility is distributed amongst different interest groups in society. 
Mosse (2006) makes a similar point, arguing that ‘equilibrium outcomes based 
on autonomous rational self-interest do not adequately represent the social 
and political forces acting on traditional systems and behaviour’. Bene and 
Neiland (2003) characterise such forces as the drivers of de facto 
governance, distinguishable from a concept of management as the 
technocratic implementation of collective actions in accordance with de jure 
rules arising from governance decisions at a higher ‘constitutional’ level 
(Schlager and Ostrom 1992). 
 
A recent body of anthropological work has also challenged the ‘neo- 
institutionalist’ clear-cut dichotomy of modern and local institutions  - 
corresponding with formal and traditional rules of the game often framed in 
opposition, as a-historical and over simplistic. Instead the rules governing 
local management systems emerge as ‘a result of negotiation and 
accommodation in long term power struggles with different actors, local and 
external basing their claims on ‘different logics and values’ that emerge over 
time (legal pluralism). Ambiguity and contradiction rather the internal 
coherence is often the norm. This ‘constructivist’ view implies that access 
regulation is a consequence of many overlapping sets of norms rather than 
just the consequence of a tension between external formal and traditional 
local rules frequently cited in the co-management literature. 
 
Bene and Neiland (2006) point to the ‘tyranny of participation’ that can be 
fostered by uncritical application of the McKay-Berkes co-management 
framework (Fig 1). As a descriptive framework it has been used extensively 
for comparative purposes – but unlike CPT offers no analytical basis for 
assessing mechanisms underlying management reforms. The mono-
dimensional concept of a gradient of power sharing at the core of model has, 
they suggest, mislead many users to over-rely on a lack of devolution/ local 
participation as an explanation for the failure of co-management approaches. 
Although participatory theorists emphasise the role of participation as the 
main or only source of empowerment, it is in fact but one of at least three 
pillars frequently cited as a requisite for decentralisation to be an effective 
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governance reform; the other two being transparency and accountability 
(Power 1997). Bene and Neiland (ibid) suggest that accountability – 
particularly when operating in a downward direction (i.e. towards the 
consumers of management decisions) – plays a more critical but frequently 
undervalued role. Indeed, without strong accountability all participatory 
approaches are likely to fail.  
 
Furthermore, whether downward accountability is best served by weak 
participation (i.e. consultation or communication) or strong/ direct participation 
(i.e. joint action – Fig 1.) is likely to be highly context specific. From a review 
of 50 fisheries in developing countries they conclude ‘each fishery in each 
society has its own balance point’ on the scale of management intervention 
from state to local level. The inappropriate imposition of strong participation 
can have negative consequences such as local elite capture in 
heterogeneous communities with marked pre-existing power differentials, 
while the imposition of ‘pseudo-participation’ amounts to manipulation of 
beneficiaries by development professionals (Deshler and Sock 1985) 
potentially resulting in increased dependency. Conversely, uncritically citing 
weak participation/ power sharing for the failure of management reforms may 
incorrectly lay the blame on the implementing agency rather than the 
community. The authors conclude that greater attention should be paid to 
how, rather than how much, power is shared. 
 
Jul-Larsen et al (ibid) also critique what they see as the management theorists 
over-emphasis on ‘who’ rather than ‘what’ should be managed, which they 
term ‘the management-belief problem’. Firstly they point to a body of work 
during the 1990’s termed the ‘new ecology’ derived mainly from empirical 
studies on forestry, pastoralism and other land use (e.g. Ellis 1988). These 
researchers challenge the traditional view of closed ecosystems free of 
human interference attaining or moving toward an equilibrium state. Instead 
they view ‘ever-changing non-equilibrium’ states as the norm due to the 
influence of key variables outside the system boundary i.e. climatic factors. 
This has major implications for CPT; an equilibrium approach which considers 
human intervention as the most significant external variable. In the new 
ecology view the correlation between fishing effort and the re-generative 
capacity of the ecosystem – and therefore the predictive value of CPT - is less 
clear due to the uncertain impact of abiotic variables. This in turn reduces the 
role for detailed fisheries regulation in certain systems i.e. especially those 
with a chaotic, seasonal or inter-annual variation. Further more such variability 
is likely to be much more characteristic of tropical (e.g. flood plain ‘pulse’ 
fisheries, seasonal reservoirs, lakes) than the temperate fisheries for which 
most of the models were developed.  
 
Nevertheless the short-comings of CPT cited by the co-management school 
overlook the fact that it is an analytical model with empirical relevance only 
when/ if its underlying assumptions are correct. Although its utility as an 
analytical tool is well demonstrated, the fact that both schools often continue 
to treat it as an empirical model has often confused and limited the wider 
scope of the debate.  
 
Jul-Larsen et al (ibid) contend that such distraction has resulted in the neglect 
of key ‘real-life’ empirical features of fisheries commons – most critically the 
complex causes and consequences of changes in fishing effort. They suggest 
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where fisheries are viewed as closed systems; increased fishing effort is often 
over-simplistically correlated with economic or demographic growth. Broader 
livelihood based perspectives indicate that effort changes are likely to be 
more dynamic than visions of a Malthusian ‘last resort’ would suggest (Pauly 
1994). Small-scale artisanal fisheries instead frequently act as economic 
buffer zones with a constant flux out as well as into the sector as opportunities 
arise in other sectors of the formal or informal economy. Furthermore fisheries 
often exist as part of a package of diversified livelihood options, concurrent or 
simultaneous, which the poor constantly juggle to manage risk. Such 
‘pluriactivity’ is especially characteristic of those living in marginal, resource 
poor or other vulnerable environments for example, fisherman and farmers 
living on flood plains. Only such a broad context allows us to appreciate the 
degree of dependency and therefore the extent to which the poor are likely to 
prioritise fishing as a livelihood activity. 
 
CO-MANAGEMENT OR NO-MANAGEMENT IN SRI LANKA? 
 
In the second section of this paper, some of the ideas developed above are 
used to address the case for co-management of commercial reservoir 
fisheries in the Dry-Zone of Sri Lanka. Findings are based on market research 
conducted in N.W Province by the author during a 21 month period from 2000 
and 2001 (Murray et al 2001).  
 
Following their introduction in the early 1950’s, tilapias rapidly colonised most 
of the country’s fresh and brackish water resources, stimulating the growth of 
what has essentially become a single-species, single-gear (gill-net) artisanal 
fishery. Today commercial production of tilapias from perennial reservoirs 
typically amounts to 80-95% of total volume. Most of this production is locally 
marketed in fresh form by diffuse networks of two-wheeler vendors, while 
urban demand is predominantly catered for with marine fish supplied by a cold 
chain. Cheaper small marine varieties such as sardines also augment rural 
consumption during seasonal periods of lean inland production. Nationally, 
fresh and dried fish constitutes 65-70% of total animal protein intake rising to 
as much as 85% in rural areas (NARA 1999, Nathaniel & Silva 1998). Given 
the economic geography of this production base, it is reasonable to assume 
that the rise of the tilapia fishery, which accompanied large-scale reservoir 
rehabilitation, was a key factor facilitating repopulation of the Dry-Zone in the 
post-independence era. 
 
Fig 2 shows the distribution of small and medium size perennial reservoirs 
supporting commercial fisheries (>200 – 2,858ha) in the research area. The 
high storage density combined with a relatively high rural population density 
(>290 persons/ km2) means that most production is marketed fresh, within a 
30-40 mile radius around multiple landing points (Plate 1) reaching even the 
most remote settlements.  
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Figure 2. Location of reservoirs with commercial fisheries in the research 
area, N.W Province Sri Lanka (Murray 2004) 
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Plate 1 Bicycle vendors purchase tilapia from a landing site on Rajangana 
reservoir at first light (note wire mesh keep cage (R) and single outsize carp 
(C) in catch) 
 
Detailed longitudinal market research focussed on fresh fish sales in 
Galgamuwa town, a small administrative and agrarian service centre 
(Population 14,680 – GOSL 2000) located close to Usgala 
Siyambalangamuwa (788ha) and Rajangana (1646ha) reservoirs (Fig 1). 
Most of its inland fish supply originates from these two sources. Volume and 
price information for inland fish and its principle substitutes was collected on 
weekly basis between January 2000 and September 2001. Main outlets were 
a busy junction for inland fish (Fig 2) and periodic roadside stalls for marine 
and occasionally inland fish. 
 
 
Plate 2. Cartel of 2-wheeler vendors selling inland fish at Galgamuwa junction 
 
Purely by chance, this research period coincided with attempts by the Ministry 
of Fisheries and Aquaculture Resource Development (MOFARD) to re-
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establish functional fishing co-operatives through co-management 
interventions. Most of these institutions had effectively collapsed after a 
politically motivated selective withdrawal of Government financial support to 
the inland fisheries and freshwater aquaculture sectors from 1989 to 1994.  
 
No reliable official statistics were collected during this period (here-after 
referred to as the ‘ban’), however anecdotal evidence points to increased 
effort resulting from rising numbers of unregulated casual entrants ‘down-
fishing’ with progressively smaller mesh sizes and intensive methods. The 
great majority of participants could be characterised as fisherman-farmers, 
relatively recently diversified into fishing. Only in Rajangane was there a 
group of specialised fishermen; low-caste (kawara), encroached / landless 
Christians – of coastal origin. Most observers contend that the inland ‘ban’ 
was politically influenced by a desire to deter this low status group from 
settling permanently in the ‘Buddhist hinterland’. As professional marine 
fishers, they were the first to recognise the commercial potential of the 
emergent tilapia fishery. At the same time the clear economic imperative 
presented by the new fishery encouraged the higher-caste farmer group to 
accommodate and ultimately normalise the practice of commercial gill-net 
fishing. Even as they retained a traditional taboo on subsistence level fishing 
using hook and line gears in smaller seasonal tanks (village reservoirs) as low 
status ‘pity work’ (Murray 2004).  
 
This trend reflects a frequent occurrence whereby non-traditional fishers move 
into established fishing grounds of professional artisanal fishers as effort 
intensifies. The distinctive feature here was the weak informal access rights 
associated with transhumance livelihood strategies of the ‘coastal-inland’ 
fishermen’s, as well as their lack of political patronage. Consequently, for the 
most part they were easily displaced by landed riparian new-comers. The few 
communities that remained can often be found in semi-permanent settlements 
illegally encroached in ‘protected’ forested watershed areas.  
 
Fishing restrictions form the main plank of most co-management strategies 
and here too the main commitment of MOFARD was to support their 
implementation and enforcement. The management goal of the restrictions 
was to sustain or increase yields while adding value through increased mean 
catch size. Their precise design was based on lengthy consultations between 
government fisheries officers and the memberships of registered fishermen’s 
co-operatives; 3 in the larger Rajangana and 1 in Usgala reservoir. This 
included meetings with the entire co-operative memberships and in the case 
of Rajangana follow-up meetings to broker consensus between the 3 different 
societies.  
 
In both reservoirs it was agreed to restrict the use of undersize nets (<7.6cm 
stretched mesh size) as well as highly efficient gears (beach seines, mono-
filament and sandwich ‘trammel’ gill nets) and intensive active-fishing 
practices know as ‘beating’. In Usgala a majority of members requested the 
imposition of an additional ban on night fishing in order to reduce poaching 
from gears set to fish passively overnight. This resulted in wastage of fish 
which perished in the gears early in the night and more seriously conflicts 
associated with the practice of poaching and damage to competitors’ nets 
under cover of darkness. This was implemented by locking boats up between 
sunset and sunrise. The consultations demonstrated that the majority of 
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fishermen were highly supportive of the need for reforms but felt that fishing 
restrictions would only be effective with external support to help enforce them.  
 
The consequences of the fishing restrictions which commenced in December 
2000 could be clearly observed in market trends for inland fish and its 
substitutes recorded in Galgamuwa Town. 
 
For the first 12 months, similar volumes of fresh inland and marine species 
were available in Galgamuwa (Fig. 3) with relatively modest and predictable 
seasonal fluctuations in supply and price.  This changed dramatically after the 
imposition of restrictions.  An immediate and sharp fall in yields of medium 
and small size tilapia (<175g) was the first consequence (Fig. 4). These lower 
cost, size classes had hitherto constituted the bulk of product reaching remote 
villages and a smaller but significant component of the town’s retail turnover. 
The deficit was compounded during February and March when priority for the 
remaining catch was given to feeding agricultural labourers harvesting the 
main paddy crop cultivated under the same reservoirs. Inland fish prices 
reached their maximum levels during this period of deficit which lasted from 
January to May 2001.  
 
This prompted opportunistic marine traders to substantially increase the 
amount of marine fish coming to market with three new stalls commencing 
daily operation to cope with the demand. This catered for retail demand in the 
town, but the greatest volumes were for wholesale distribution through bicycle 
networks supplying surrounding villages, now with negligible access to their 
primary source of inland supply. Most of this volume consisted of sardines 
(72.3% of entire marine sales) which were fortuitously in plentiful seasonal 
supply during the period of restriction. The low prices of these varieties made 
them almost perfect substitutes for small tilapias (Fig. 3 - their high cross-
elasticity of demand is only impeded by inferior quality perceptions associated 
with iced fish). 
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Figure 3 Mean daily volumes of fresh inland and marine fish and mean 
monthly retail prices for selected varieties in Galgamuwa town NWP 2000-
2001 (standard deviations indicated) 
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Figure 5. Mean total daily volumes for principle fresh inland fish varieties and 
mean monthly retail prices for selected varieties in Galgamuwa town NWP 
2000-2001 (price standard deviations indicated) 
 
After a period of rigorous compliance the restrictions began to break down 
and once free-riding commenced the complete break-down of rules ensued 
rapidly; first in Rajangana reservoir and subsequently and more progressively 
in Usgala. In the first instance conflicts between the different co-operatives 
occurred when the gears of the kawara group who had extended their 
informally accepted fishing range (for want of alternative income activities), 
were damaged by a second group. In Usgala the breakdown was internal to 
the single group and commenced with the resumption of night fishing by a 
small number of individuals. The incentive to free-ride was enhanced by 
dramatic yield reductions in the short-term, indicating that a more progressive 
system of restrictions may have been more sustainable. In this respect, the 
uniform adoption of a ban on small-mesh gillnets <7.6cm, (the prevailing 
though rarely observed legal limit), suggests that the outcomes of the 
consultation process were to some extent pre-determined by MOFARD to 
comply with national statutes. 
 
Attempts by the co-operatives to resolve the conflicts failed as no effective 
external enforcement mechanism was available. This was despite the good 
intentions of local fisheries officers who were few in number and lacked 
resources (e.g. officers frequently relied on public transport to visit reservoir 
sites). There was also a lack of co-operation between different government 
agencies and political patronage was offered to influential free-riders. 
 
By June 2001 intensive fishing practices had resumed in both locations with 
production levels rebounding to the highest levels and lowest prices observed 
during the survey period. Total volume reached over 330kg per day consisting 
 14
mainly of smaller tilapias whose price fell to Rs30/ kg during August 2001. 
Marine supplies immediately fell as a consequence – with the same 
stallholders moving to trade surplus tilapia while the glut lasted. This surge in 
productivity, which was well above the usual seasonal dry-season increase in 
CPUE can be attributed to the protection given to younger cohorts during the 
effective period of fishing restriction.  
 
The intensive gillnet fishery has undoubtedly had negative secondary impacts 
on indigenous biodiversity; once commercially significant minor cyprinids such 
as Labeo porcellus, L. dussumieri and Puntius sarana are now at the edge of 
consumer memory. However the rapid total yield recovery demonstrates the 
outstanding resilience of tilapia stocks to the same pressure and explains their 
increasing contribution to total catches. This is attributable to tilapia’s r-
selected ecological traits which include: high fecundity; small size; short 
generation time; and the ability to disperse offspring widely. Such traits confer 
advantages in unstable or unpredictable environments, exemplified in this 
instance by wide hydrological fluctuations associated with periods of intense 
fishing effort. The ability to reproduce quickly at small size is especially crucial 
in this context. Tilapias can breed at sizes well below 20g, will reach sexual 
maturity after only 6 months and breed much more evenly throughout the year 
than other indigenous and exotic carps whose reproductive behaviour is tied 
more closely to the monsoonal cycle. Therefore even in an intensive open 
access fishery, a highly responsive dynamic equilibrium is likely to operate as 
participants move in and out of the fishery in response to yield variations. 
Although CPUE levels were not evaluated in these commercial fisheries, 
subsistence fishermen harvesting seasonal tanks in the same area rarely 
extended fishing activity at levels below 0.5kg/hr (Murray 2004). 
 
It would be instructive to test the generality of this thesis against official inland 
catch statistics. Unfortunately, such statistics are extremely sensitive to 
monitoring capacity which was all but absent during the ‘ban’ and remains 
weak. Yet they are still an important basis for formulation of fisheries 
management policy so will be considered briefly. The period of the ‘ban’ is of 
particular interest – as it was effectively a reverse of the current case study – 
deregulation followed by an attempt to restore management systems. 
Available statistics (Fig. 5) suggest a dramatic crash (1989) followed by a 
steep rebound in freshwater yields after withdrawal of the ‘ban’ (1994) 
whereas an immediate surge in production would be a much more likely 
consequence of de-regulation. This is supported by results from a scientific 
case-study of 5 reservoirs (Amerasinghe 1999) which detected a decrease in 
mean landing sizes for the two dominant species of tilapia in the fishery 
shortly after the ‘ban’. 
 
Regardless of provenance, the official figures have been used to support 
resumption of some ‘pre-ban’ (1980’s) intervention strategies which attract 
sizeable bilateral grant or loan support e.g. culture based-stocking 
enhancements. Low recovery rates of stocked fish, particularly in larger 
perennial water (>700ha Amarasinghe 1988) have resulted in a shift of focus 
to smaller perennial and semi-seasonal water bodies. However, here too, little 
evidence exists to suggest sustained community involvement or incentive for 
private sector seed provision (Murray 2001). 
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The largest surge in reported production during the late 1980’s correlates 
more closely with state rather than private sector investment. Heavily 
subsidised gears (fibre-glass out-rigger canoes and gill-nets) were provided 
by the government from 1979 onwards (Amarasinghe 1999). This also had 
institutional consequences. Funds were to be channelled exclusively through 
newly established fisheries co-operative societies providing an incentive for 
almost all fishermen operating in the country’s perennial reservoirs to register 
for membership (Amarasinghe ibid). MOFARD then implemented 
management policies through these institutions. This client-focused 
arrangement suggests that local resource users had negligible institutional 
leverage to demand downward accountability and decentralisation of 
decision-making processes from MOFARD. Even where real political will to 
decentralised governance exists – such institutional leverage is a key feature 
of sustainable co-management options. 
 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
Year
In
la
nd
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(' 
00
0s
 m
t) 
or
 %
 to
ta
l f
is
he
rie
s 
pr
od
uc
tio
n
Inland production ( ' 000s mt)      % of total marine and inland production       
Figure 5. Inland fish production in Sri Lanka 1970-1997 (source NARA 
Fisheries Year Book 1998) 
 
Commodity price indices offer a more reliable means of evaluating the 
balance between population-driven increases in demand and available supply 
(Fig 6). Between 1992 and 1998, the retail price of tilapia rose almost in parity 
with inflation which averaged 12.2% per annum equivalent to a compound 
rate of 103% over the same 7 years (Central Bank 1998). This historic stability 
also points to the resilient regenerative capacity of the fishery and suggests 
fears of over-exploitation are unfounded despite anecdotal reports of 
decreases in individual fisher yields. Such resilience together with the highly 
segmented demand for inland fish (i.e. predominantly rural) is also the main 
reason for the lack of an economically viable inland food-fish aquaculture 
sector in Sri Lanka – yet kick-starting this sector also remains a key tenet 
underlying technical assistance grants solicited by the state. 
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Figure 6. Historic trends in fresh fish and meat substitute retail prices, 
Colombo 1989-1999 (Data Source ARTI 1988). Note: round bars = total % 
increase in retail price over the 7 year period. 
 
 
Findings from this research bear some striking parallels with those of Jul-
Larsen et al (ibid) on SADC small and medium-scale lake fisheries; 
particularly with regard to their caution against over-reliance on classical 
management theory emphasis on limiting numbers of fishermen and uncritical 
application of co-management strategies. 
 
In both studies fishing intensification resulted mainly from increasing numbers 
of fishers over and above investment or technology driven change (e.g. more 
efficient gears). Furthermore, environmental rather than economic factors 
appear to be the predominant causal factors underlying this change. The 
regenerative resilience of the tilapia fishery, the principle environmental driver 
was considered above. The economic drivers of intensification are assessed 
in the remaining part of the text. 
 
The incentive for external investment driven growth is limited due to the fact 
that the market already equates closely to the elusive assumptions of ‘perfect 
competition’ underlying micro-economic demand and supply theory i.e. there 
exists (1) a highly homogeneous quality fresh product, (2) free access to 
market information associated with localised demand (3) all actors are price-
takers (4) only ‘normal’ profits are available resulting in highly equitable value 
chain margins and (5) low trading overheads in dispersed rural markets for 
inland fish promote free entry in and out of the market. 
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These factors also help explain the persistence of low-tech production and 
distribution networks (canoes, gill-nets and bicycles) with low reliance on 
external inputs e.g. fuel or refrigeration costs. This is in marked contrast to the 
marine and other agricultural sectors where availability of scale-economies 
(e.g. bulking-opportunities) and provision of costly external inputs are closely 
associated with tied-marketing contracts and long-term credit and other 
service provision by a relatively small number of external agents with access 
to investment capital. In the inland sector, such transactions are for the most 
part highly localised, small-scale and take place mainly on an informal 
relational basis directly between producers and one or more vendors.  
 
Such features effectively insulate the inland fishery from external ‘shocks’ 
experienced in the wider liberalizing economy e.g. policy fluctuations on state 
market interventions, input/ output subsidies, volatile energy and 
agrochemical prices etc. For example, technology driven intensification in the 
marine sector followed by increasing fuel prices drove many artisanal 
motorised day-boats from the inshore sector prior to the tsunami (Kelegama 
1999). Viewed in this ‘vulnerability context’ – the resilience (see below) and 
distributive equitability of the inland sector clearly makes it directly and 
indirectly, a vital safety-net to large numbers of the rural poor: producers, 
market intermediaries and consumers. From a policy perspective in this sector 
at least, a precautionary approach should be taken to promotion of external 
investment driven growth; for example through attempts to promote urban 
consumption of inland fish to promote an aquaculture sector. Such attempts 
are anyway unlikely to have much realistic chance of success given the 
current configuration of robust fishery and segmented consumer demand.  
 
Social differentiation between resource users was a further key-feature of the 
current study. Only the full-time low-caste (kawara) fishermen could be 
considered users of the last resort and consequently, it was they who were 
the first to be driven to significant levels of opportunistic free-riding behaviour. 
By contrast the great majority of landed fishermen-farmers with more 
diversified livelihood portfolios relied on fishing more as an economic-buffer 
than a sole-income provider. This relative economic mobility undoubtedly 
enhanced their propensity to comply with sanctions, added to which the main 
period of the sanctions also coincided with the busiest season in the 
agricultural calendar. 
 
The current case study not only demonstrates a failure of the planned co-
management strategy – but also raises serious questions regarding its wider 
applicability as a governance reform in the specific environmental and socio-
economic context of the Dry-Zone reservoir fishery. Firstly there is a lack of 
clear evidence that productivity gains would justify the additional institutional 
transaction costs given the highly regenerative capacity of the tilapia fishery. 
Secondly in the absence of effective enforcement, restrictions on smaller 
sized catches are likely to have disproportionately adverse effects on the 
poorest groups in the market chain including remote consumers. Furthermore 
significant private-sector investment driven growth is unlikely given the current 
market configuration whereby simple fishing methods with lower CPUE are 
likely to prevail over more capital intensive technologies. In this context it 
seems evident that the bipolar management framework (Fig 1) should be 
expanded to incorporate a more laissez-faire or ‘no-management’ approach.  
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RELEVANCE OF FINDINGS TO BANGLADESH FLOODPLAIN 
FISHERIES 
 
These findings also point to useful comparative lessons with other resource 
settings – especially where there is comparable reliance on inland fish as a 
provider of high-quality dietary protein. For example, population-driven 
intensification in Bangladesh floodplain fisheries has also resulted in catch 
composition moving towards small and fast maturing species low in the food 
chain. Self-recruiting r-selected exotics such as tilapia (first introduced here 
too in the 1950’s) are likely to become more significant in wild catches though 
environmental conditions are far less favourable for tilapia than in Sri Lankan 
reservoirs. Inland fishery yields have declined dramatically over recent 
decades contributing to the emergence of a rapidly growing and diversifying 
aquaculture sector which today constitutes some 30% of a total annual 
fisheries yield of 1,400,000 mt (De Graaf and Latif 2006). This trend seems 
set to continue and seems to be the most realistic means of securing the 
country’s future fish needs (Gregory et al 2007). Yet such intensification 
inevitably demands higher investment security including secure property 
rights, which, in turn is likely to drive increased privatisation and enclosure of 
seasonal floodplain commons. Given the traditional reliance of large numbers 
of functionally land-less farmers and fishermen on such shared aquatic 
resources, there appears to be a compelling role for co-management 
approaches within development policy. These approaches may have potential 
for application within the stagnating fishery and emergent aquaculture sectors 
(see below). 
 
Co-management enabling factors include the wide availability of NGO 
sponsored micro-credit and improving access to relatively un-segmented 
(compared to Sri Lanka) local and regional markets and a favourable policy 
environment. Constraints to community-based fisheries management (CBFM) 
include: complex social relations, weak public-sector capacity for longer-term 
institutional support, insecure and overlapping access rights, to floodplain 
resources, rent seeking by local elites, competing land-uses, competing off-
farm employment opportunities (including aquaculture!) and uncertain returns 
to effort. 
 
In terms of economic sustainability at least, aquaculture based co-
management systems appear to have demonstrated greater promise than 
CBFM models, most of which remain pilot initiatives strongly supported by 
donor projects. Two recent examples of the former approach are predicated 
on the pooling and enclosure of private lands under seasonal floodplains for 
semi-intensive aquaculture. The first, developed by Worldfish and the local 
NGO, Proshika (Dey and Prein 2005) relies on temporary enclosure (fencing 
which also permits ingress of small wild fish) culture-based stocking and 
feeding. The so-called Daudkandi model, named after its area of origin near 
Comilla and originated by the NGO SHISUK, is a more intensive model 
requiring higher investment in earthen dykes which extend the inundation 
period.  
 
The models also have markedly different institutional frameworks with 
consequences for poverty-impact (this is highly significant since both models 
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exclude traditional fishers from their communal fishing grounds). The first 
relies on traditional NGO advocacy to support inclusion of the landless-poor 
as labourers. Unfortunately such transaction costs are rarely acknowledged or 
fully-costed, raising serious doubts over their sustained inclusion once 
external support is withdrawn. The Daudkandi model is a more novel joint-
venture co-operative model incorporating low-cost micro-credit share options 
for poorer community members. The NGO also engages as an active share-
holding partner committing them to a longer term presence and there is clear 
evidence of sustained positive impacts on local economies including 
employment and service opportunities for the poor, nutritional benefits and 
higher interim rice yields. 
Nevertheless, here too questions remain regarding potential for longer-term 
elite capture (Gregory et al 2007). SHISUK are currently testing the model in 
perennial beels (shallow floodplain lakes - with fisheries under public 
ownership) where many CBFM models have been applied with limited 
evidence of sustainable adoption. 
 
In conclusion co-management projects are likely to fail if they ignore 
contextual issues which influence the propensity of the individual to participate 
in mutually beneficial collective actions. Despite claims to the contrary, no 
effective blueprint approaches exist. Instead adaptive approaches are 
required. The observations presented here underscore the importance of 
moving beyond the view of a closed system to placement of fisheries within 
their wider environmental, social and economic context. 
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